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Insurance Law. Hindson v. Allstate Insurance Co., 694 A.2d 682
(R.I. 1997). Where two insurance policies are applicable to a loss,
and each would provide primary coverage if it were the only applicable policy, the court will require that each insurer pay a pro-rata
share despite the existence of an other-insurance clause.

FACTS AND TRAVEL

On November 10, 1991, William Hindson (Hindson) was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Joseph Lukowicz (Lukowicz).' The
Lukowicz vehicle was rear-ended by a vehicle driven by Michael
Casino (Casino). Hindson was injured in the crash. 2 The Casino
vehicle had liability insurance in the amount of $15,000 per person/$30,000 per accident. This amount was less than the damages
claimed by the plaintiff. Lukowicz was insured by a policy issued
by Pennsylvania General Insurance Company (Penn General).
This policy provided uninsured/underinsured-motorist coverage for
a maximum amount of $300,000. Hindson had personal automobile insurance with Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate) for
3
$100,000 per person/$300,000 per accident.
Hindson notified Penn General and Allstate that he intended
to file an underinsured claim under both policies. 4 Both insurance
companies attempted to limit their liability. Penn General
claimed, under its policy, that each insurer should pay a pro-rata
share of the loss. 5 Allstate claimed that its coverage should be in
6
excess, and Penn General should be the primary insurer.
1. See Hindson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 682, 683 (R.I. 1997).
2. See id. Hindson's wife was also injured in the crash. For convenience, the
court referred only to William as the plaintiff within its opinion. See id. at 683 n.3.
3. See id.
4. See id. Under Rhode Island law, lain underinsured motorist is the owner
or operator of a motor vehicle who carries automobile liability insurance with cov-

erage in an amount less than the limits or damages that persons insured pursuant
to this section are legally entitled to recover because of bodily injury, sickness, or
disease." R.I. Gen. Laws § 27-7-2.1 (1956) (1994 Reenactment).
5. See Hindson, 694 A.2d at 683. The pertinent clause in the Penn General
policy stated: "[i]f there is other applicable similar insurance we will pay only our
share of the loss. Our share is the proportionthat our limit of liability bears to the
total of all applicable limits." Id. (emphasis added).

6. See id. The provision in the Allstate policy stated that "[i]f the insured
person was in, on, getting into or out of a vehicle which is insured for this coverage
under another policy, this coverage will be excess." Id. (emphasis added).
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Hindson filed an action for a declaratory judgment, asking
each insurer to pay a pro-rata share of his loss. 7 Penn General

filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that precedent favored pro-rata coverage. Allstate objected and filed a cross-motion
for summary judgment 8 Allstate's motion was granted. The motion judge held that Penn General's policy was primary, and Allstate's was excess. 9 Penn General appealed this decision.
BACKGROUND

In Brown v. Travelers Insurance Co.,1O the Rhode Island
Supreme Court discussed other-insurance clauses. 1 The court described four variations of other-insurance clauses:
(1) the "pro-rata" clause, which provides that an insurer will
pay its share of the loss in proportion to the aggregate liability coverage available for the same risk, (2) the "excess"
clause, which provides that an insurer will pay for a loss only
after any primary coverage of other available insurance has
been exhausted, (3) the "escape" clause, which provides that
the insurer is not liable for any and all liability if other coverage is available, and (4) the "excess-escape" clause, a hybrid,
which provides that the insurer is liable for the amount of the
loss that exceeds the limits of other available insurance and
that the insurer is not liable when other available coverage
12
contains limits equal to or in excess of its own limits.

In Brown, two policies contained other-insurance clauses. The
Metropolitan policy contained an excess clause.' 3 The Travelers
policy contained an escape clause. 14 The court searched other jurisdictions to decide how to interpret the clauses because Brown
was a case of first impression in Rhode Island. 15
7. See id. at 684.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. 610 A.2d 127 (R.I. 1992).
11. See id. at 128.
12. Id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 331 So. 2d 638
(Ala. 1776); Bertini v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 362 N.E.2d 1355 (Ill.
1977);
Royal-Globe Ins. Cos v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 560 S.W.2d 22 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978);
American Home Assurance Co., v. Fish, 451 A.2d 358 (N.H. 1982); Equity Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Spring Valley Wholesale Nursery, Inc., 747 P.2d 947 (Okla. 1987).
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The court noted that this other-insurance clause issue "forced
some courts to referee the 'battle of the draftsmen' waged by insurance companies." 16 The court's concern was that each insurer attempted to disclaim liability "toward Brown, a result that cannot
be permitted to occur." 17 The rule that the court found most effective was that of jurisdictions that require "both insurers to share
the loss on a pro-rata basis."' 8 The court held that "this conflict
between an excess clause in one policy and an escape clause in another is more readily and efficiently resolved by requiring both insurers to afford pro-rata liability." 19
ANALYsIs
In Hindson, under Penn General's position, each insurer
would pay a "pro-rata share of the loss based on the ratio between
the amounts of insurance provided under the insurers' individual
policies." 20 Allstate's position was that due to the availability of
other insurance, "it is only responsible for the excess, after the lim21
its on the Penn General policy have been exhausted."
This issue was a case of first impression in Rhode Island.
Therefore, the Rhode Island Supreme Court looked to other courts
to decide how to deal with the competing other-insurance
clauses. 22 The court noted two distinct lines of authority. 2 3 The
majority of courts take the same position as Allstate-that the
court disregards the pro-rata clause and gives the excess clause
24
full effect.
16. Brown, 610 A.2d at 130.
17. Id. The court observed that the real victim of the battle of the draftsmen
was the insured:
Although we do not believe that either clause, taken together, is mutually
repugnant, we do believe that ruling in full for either Metropolitan or
Travelers would lend more ammunition to the battle of the drafters. We
do not wish to encourage the complication of insurance legerdemain at the
expense of the policy holders' money or the courts' time.
Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Hindson, 694 A.2d at 684.
21. Id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id. (citing 16 Couch on Insurance 2d § 62:72, at 530 (rev. ed. 1983)).
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There are two theories to this authority. One theory is that
the policy with the pro-rata clause conflicts with the excess clause.
Since the pro-rata policy has no other insurance to prorate with, it
"becomes the primary coverage." 25 The second theory is that
where the nonowner's insurance contains an excess clause, the vehicle owner's insurance provides the primary coverage. 2 6 The
court rejected these theories and instead adopted the reasoning of
the Oregon Supreme Court in Lamb-Weston Inc. v. Oregon Auto27
mobile Insurance Co.
In Lamb-Weston, there were two insurers, St. Paul Fire and
Marine Insurance Company (St. Paul) and Oregon Automobile Insurance Company (Oregon). 28 The Oregon policy contained a pro30
rata clause. 2 9 The St. Paul policy contained an excess clause. If
either insurance policy was the only applicable insurance policy,
then that company would have been liable for the loss. 3 ' The trial
court found that Oregon was the primary insurer and therefore responsible for the entire loss. Oregon argued that it should be liable
32
for only one-half of the loss.
The trial court stated that in a situation such as this, a "court
is faced with determining which company shall be considered primarily liable, or treating the 'other insurance' clause in each insurer's policy as so repugnant that they must both be ignored, and
apply the rule that the loss shall be equally prorated between
them."33 The trial court had applied the rule of primary and secon34
dary liability.
25. Id.; see also Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 560 A.2d
722 (N.J. 1989).
26. See id.; see, e.g., Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co. v. Globe Am. Cas. Co., 426
N.W.2d 625 (Iowa 1988).
27. 341 P.2d 110 (Or. 1959).
28. See id. at 113.
29. Id. at 112. The clause said that "if the insured has other insurance
against a loss covered by this policy the Company shall not be liable under this
policy for a greater proportion of such loss than the applicable limit of liability
stated in the declaration bears to the total applicable limit of all valid and collectible insurance against such loss." Id.
30. See id. at 114. The clause stated that "[ilf the Insured's liability under
this policy is covered by any other valid and collectible insurance, then this policy
shall act as excess insurance over and above such other insurance." Id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. Id. at 114.
34. See id.
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The Oregon Supreme Court found that the difficulty with this
rule of primary and secondary liability was not in its application,
"but in finding sound reasoning upon which to base a determination of primary and secondary liability."35 After searching other
jurisdictions for an answer to this question, the court held that
"[iun our opinion, whether one policy uses one clause or another,
when any come in conflict with the 'other insurance' clause of another insurer, regardless of the nature of the clause, they are in
36
fact repugnant and each should be rejected in toto."
In Hindson, the Rhode Island Supreme Court stated that
Lamb-Weston "provides the better solution to these conflicting
other-insurance-clause cases." 3 7 The Hindson court acknowledged
that the argument that the court should give other-insurance
clauses effect. However, the court rejected this reasoning, stating:
On the one hand, we wish to avoid using an arbitrary "rock,
paper, scissors" approach in comparing other-insurance
clauses and then determining which policy or policies should
provide primary coverage. On the other hand, we also seek to
call at least a temporary halt to the incessant "battle of the
draftsmen" waged by, between, and among the various insurance companies in these other-insurance-clause cases. 38
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that, "[wihen as here
an insurance policy would provide primary coverage to an insured
if it were the only applicable policy, we are of the opinion that the
coverage responsibilities of all such insurers should be shared on a
pro-rata basis despite the existence of conflicting other-insurance
clauses."3 9
35. Id. The court also discussed the theory of prior in time. In this theory,
courts hold the policy issued first as primary and give effect to its provision. The
court recognized that many courts have rejected this theory. See id. The court also
rejected the rule that primary and secondary coverage is decided by which policy is
"the most specific in its terms or coverage or rejection of coverage." Id.
36. Id. at 119.
37. Hindson, 694 A.2d at 685.
38. Id. The Oregon Supreme Court also recognized that an argument exists
that some effect should be given to an "other-insurance clause." See Lamb-Weston
341 P.2d at 119. Here, this would result in Oregon paying its pro-rata share, and
St. Paul paying the excess. The court stated that although this may be a just result, it leads " to a return to the circular reasoning necessary to establish primary
and secondary liability." Id.
39. Id.
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CONCLUSION

Insurance policies are infamous for their clauses. As the
Rhode Island Supreme Court in Hindson acknowledged, the "battle of the draftsmen" is a problem for the courts. It creates a
greater problem for the insured who needs to wait out the battle to
get paid. The court stated in Hindson:
Inevitably the front-line casualties of such clashes are the insureds. Thus in this case, despite the passage of five-andone-half years since the November 10, 1991 automobile accident, the entrenched insurers continue to exchange legal gunfire over the fine print in their other-insurance clauses-only
pausing, periodically, to glare at one another warily from
their respective parapets-while the plaintiff has still not recovered for his insured losses. 40
The court solves this problem by holding that both insurers must
pay a pro-rata share despite the existence of other-insurance
clauses.
Lisa M. Kolb

40. Id.
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Insurance Law. Ryan v. Knoller, 695 A.2d 990 (R.I. 1997). An
intoxication-exclusion provision contained in an automobile rentalinsurance agreement is void as against public policy.
In Ryan v. Knollerl the Rhode Island Supreme Court held
that an automobile rental-insurance agreement, which excluded liability coverage when the vehicle was used by an intoxicated
driver, was void as against public policy. The court held that public policy dictates that innocent third parties should be protected
by state financial-responsibility laws. This public policy cannot be
2
frustrated through the use of such exclusions.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On August 20, 1993, Suzanne Arechavala (Arechavala) rented
3
a car from International Car Rental in Newport, Rhode Island.
Ms. Arechavala listed Christopher Knoller (Knoller) as an "additional driver" in the rental agreement. The rental agreement provided liability coverage, underwritten by Indemnity Insurance
Company of North America (Indemnity). 4 Rhode Island mandates
liability insurance for rental cars. 5 The rental agreement, however, stated that coverage would only be provided if the vehicle was
used in accordance with the rental agreement. 6 The rental agreement specifically stated that the "vehicle will not be used by anyone... [wihile intoxicated."7 Knoller was also personally insured
by Worldwide Underwriters Insurance Company (Worldwide),
which covered him "whenever he drove a vehicle that he did not
8
own."
On August 23, 1993, while under the influence of alcohol,
Knoller was driving the rental vehicle and was in an accident with
Kevin Ryan and Lisa Young. 9 Mr. Ryan and Ms. Young filed suit
against Knoller, Arechavala and International Car Rental for inju1. 695 A.2d 990 (R.I. 1997).
2. See id. at 992.
3. See id. at 991.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

See
See
See
Id.
Id.
See

id.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-34-1 (1956) (1996 Reenactment).
Ryan, 695 A.2d at 991.

id.
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ries sustained in the accident. 10 The suit was settled for $92,500.11
Indemnity and Worldwide continued the action via a fourth-party
complaint to determine which company was liable for payment and
for what amount. 12 The superior court granted summary judgment for Indemnity based on the intoxication-exclusion clause contained in the rental agreement. 13 Worldwide appealed the
14
judgment to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.
BACKGROUND

Since 1950, Rhode Island has required owners of rental vehicles to maintain liability insurance.' 5 As of November 1, 1993two months after this accident-all drivers were required to main16
tain liability insurance under the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act.
The purpose of this subsequent act is to ensure "that motorists
shall be financially able to respond in damages for their negligent
acts, so that innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents may be
recompensed for the injury and financial loss inflicted upon
them."'17
Numerous jurisdictions have considered insurance policies
which contain intoxication exclusions.' The "overwhelming majority" of jurisdictions have concluded that intoxication exclusions
are void as against public policy. 1 9 Courts so holding find the
statement of public policy integrated in mandatory insurance legislation. 20 These jurisdictions have found that allowing such exclusions would frustrate the public policy of protecting innocent third
parties. 21 Furthermore, the courts theorize that if the exclusions
are allowed, then insurers would soon create exclusions for any
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 991-92.
13. See id. at 992.
14. See id.
15. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-34-1 (1956) (1996 Reenactment); see also MilesUn-Ltd. v. Fanning, 624 A.2d 843, 846 (R.I. 1993).
16. See R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 31-47-1 to -19 (1956) (1996 Reenactment).
17. R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-47-1(b) (1996).
18. See cases cited infra notes 20, 22.
19. Ryan, 695 A.2d at 992-93.
20. See, e.g., Royal Indem. Co. v. Olmstead, 193 F.2d 451, 453 (9th Cir. 1951).
21. See id.
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negligence on the part of the driver, effectively reducing the insurance to a nullity.22
A minority of jurisdictions have held that intoxication exclusions do not violate public policy. In Sutherland v. NN Investors
Life Insurance Co.,23 the First Circuit held that Massachusetts
does not have such a policy. 2 4 This decision was based on a longrepealed statute which mandated the wording of an insurance-intoxication exclusion. 2 5 The First Circuit held that Massachusetts
public policy allowed such exclusions, and the repeal simply allows
the exclusion to take any form. 26 Other jurisdictions have found
the exclusions valid because of the absence of statutes mandating
insurance. 27
ANALYsis AND HOLDING

In determining the public policy of the State of Rhode Island,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court first looked to the statute mandating liability insurance for rental-car owners. 28 The statute re29
quires rental owners to purchase insurance and not self-insure.
In an earlier decision, the court found that the self-insurance prohibition "require[s] owners of rental vehicles to comply with a more
rigorous standard for proving financial responsibility than normal
operators of motor vehicles." 30 In Ryan, the supreme court determined that this requirement "thereby express[es] a policy in this
3
state in favor of insurance coverage by rental vehicle companies." '
The court noted that the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act, although
22. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 643 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982) ("The liability protection for which the lessee has paid could be reduced to a
nullity by rental provisions prohibiting operation of the car negligently or contrary
to any statute or ordinance.").
23. 897 F.2d 593 (1st Cir. 1990).
24. See id. at 596.
25. See id. at 595-96. Massachusetts General Laws provide mandatory language for numerous provisions in insurance contracts. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
175, § 108 (1987). Before 1971, this section included mandatory language for intoxication exclusions. See Sutherland, 897 F.2d at 596.
26. See Sutherland, 897 F.2d at 596
27. See, e.g., Public Employees Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hertz Corp., 800 P.2d 831,833
(Wash. Ct. App. 1990) ("[W]e will not rely on the out-of-state cases cited . . . because the results in those cases are grounded on specific state statutes.").
28. See Ryan, 695 A.2d at 992.
29. R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-34-1 n.1 (1996).
30. Miles-Un-Ltd. v. Fanning, 624 A.2d 843, 848 (R.I. 1993).
31. Ryan, 695 A.2d at 992.
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not in effect at the time of the accident, further demonstrates that
32
public policy requires insurance.
Before ascertaining whether intoxication exclusions violate
this public policy, the court first had to determine the purpose behind the policy. Since section 31-34-1 does not contain a statement
of purpose, the court had to look elsewhere.3 3 The justices were
likely influenced by the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act, an act not
in effect at the time of the accident. 3 4 In that Act, the legislature
stated that the purpose was the protection of innocent victims. 3 5
The court characterized the purpose of the mandatory vehicle36
rental insurance as "protection of the public."
Having determined that public policy requires insurance for
the protection of the public, the court held that intoxication exclusions may not be used to elude that purpose.3 7 The condition of the
driver "is wholly beyond the ability of the injured person to control."38 "[I]ntoxication exclusion provisions that attempt to restrict
or limit insurance coverage for rental vehicles are void."39 The
court thus joined the majority of the jurisdictions that have considered the issue.
The court proceeded to distinguish decisions from those jurisdictions that have held intoxication exclusions valid. The First
Circuit's holding in Sutherland was distinguished because Massachusetts ostensibly has a public policy favoring the exclusion. 40
The court distinguished other jurisdictions that lack statutes man41
dating liability insurance.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the General Assembly enacted mandatory insurance for rental vehicles to protect
the public. Intoxication exclusions defeat that protection for the
innocent victims of accidents. Consequently, intoxication exclu32. See id.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-34-1 (1956) (1996 Reenactment).
R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-47-1 (1956) (1996 Reenactment).
See id.
Ryan, 695 A.2d at 992.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 995.
See id. at 994-95; supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
See id. at 994.
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sions are void as against public policy. The same analysis dictates
that the exclusions may be invalid in the case of ordinary driver's
insurance. Similar exclusions, which would result in diminishing
the protection of the public required by statute, face a similar fate.
The basis for determining the public policy was statutory. An
insurance provision that reduces coverage to the statutory minimum when the driver is intoxicated was not before the court, and
may still be valid. Similarly, an exclusion provision that eliminates protection afforded under non-liability policies may also be
valid.
Mark R. Quigley

